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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."' This guarantee is considered to be fundamental to the American
scheme of justice and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.2 The protection against double jeopardy
was well established in the common law of England before being adopted in
American jurisprudence as part of the common law and the United States
Constitution.3
The simplicity of the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause belies the
difficulty of its application. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's double
jeopardy jurisprudence has lacked congruity and clarity, thereby once inspiring
the Court to observe that "the decisional law in the area is a veritable Sargasso
Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." 4
The confusion stems at least in part from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Clause as barring not just multiple prosecutions for the
same offense, but also the imposition of multiple punishments for the same
offense.5 This latter protection, the so-called multiple-punishments component,
has been the basis for two recent Supreme Court cases that have combined to
extend the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6 The prohibition against
multiple punishments usually arises in the context of parallel criminal and civil
proceedings instituted against a defendant for the same course of conduct. 7 The
1 U.S. CoNgS. amend. V.
2 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937)).
3 WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRanNAL PocDUn § 24.1(a) (1984).
4 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). The Sargasso Sea is a region in
the North Atlantic Ocean, northeast of the West Indies, that is known for its abundance of
sargassum. Sargassum is a type of floating, brown seaweed. WEBSTnR's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICrioNARY2015 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986).
5 See discussion infra part III.
6 See discussion infra parts lI.B-C, V.
7 For a discussion of this double jeopardy concept, see Linda S. Eads, Separating
Crime From Punishment: The Conrutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 929 (1990); Nelson T. Abbott, Note, United States v. Halper: Making
Double Jeopardy Available in Ovil Aaions, 6 B.Y.U. I. PUB. L. 551 (1992); Lauren 0.
Clapp, Note, United States v. Halper: Remedial Jutice and Double Jeopardy, 68 N.C. L.
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applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause, however, to situations involving a
criminal proseceition and a prior or subsequent civil suit is of doubtful
validity.8
This Note addresses whether the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause really embodies a bar against the imposition of multiple punishments for
the same offense. Part I reviews the Supreme Court's double jeopardy
jurisprudence in parallel criminal and civil cases. Part III addresses the scope of
double jeopardy protection adopted by the Supreme Court in its decisional law
dealing with the Clause. Part IV of this Note presents the argument against
recognizing the existence of a multiple-punishments component within the
double jeopardy guarantee. Part V then examines the Court's misguided use of
the multiple-punishments concept in two noncriminal cases. Finally, Part VI
concludes with a summary of the proper constitutional role the Double
Jeopardy Clause should play in the context of parallel criminal and civil
proceedings.
H. THE SUPREME COURT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE IN CASES
INVOLVING PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A. The Statutory Construction Cases
For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court constructed a double
jeopardy jurisprudence that steadfastly refused to hold a sanction sought in a
civil proceeding as being violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.9 Beginning
REV. 979 (1990); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Cvi! Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy
Caause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United
States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990); Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line
Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited Punishment: ivil Penalty Violates the
Double Jeopardy Cause-United States v. Halper, 65 WAsH. L. REv. 437 (1990);
Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive Cvil Fines, and the Double
Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Causes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (1991).
8 See discussion infra part IV.
9 It is worth noting that there were several nineteenth century cases in which the
Supreme Court suggested that the imposition of a civil penalty subsequent to a criminal
action might be punishment within the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g.,
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) (holding that an in rem forfeiture action
brought against distilling equipment was barred by the owner's prior acquittal on related
criminal charges), overruled by United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 361 (1984) (holding that "neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil,
remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges");
United States v. Ulrici, 111 U.S. 38 (1884) (barring action to recover a monetary tax
penalty from a distiller because of the prior court-sanctioned seizure and sale of the spirits
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in 1938, the Court articulated a statutory construction test that was followed
consistently until 1989.10
In Helvering v. Mitchell, t the Court addressed the issue of ALAher the
Double Jeopardy Clause should bar a civil action brought by the government
following a criminal proceeding based on the same facts. The Court held that
the "question is one of statutory construction." 12 If the sanction was provided
for by a statute that was civil in nature, then double jeopardy protection did not
extend to the civil proceeding. 13 The Mitchell statutory construction test
became the standard for the Court's analysis of subsequent cases involving the
application of double jeopardy protection to civil proceedings.
In Mitchell, the defendant was acquitted in a criminal trial of charges of tax
evasion stemming from a determination by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the defendant had fraudulently declared certain tax deductions on
his 1929 income tax return.14 Subsequently, the government brought a civil
action against Mitchell to collect the amount of the alleged tax deficiency plus
an additional fifty-percent statutory penalty for fraud. 15 Mitchell contended that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the civil action because the fifty-percent
penalty was intended as punishment, thereby transforming the tax assessment
for the fraudulent acts of the distiller); United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603 (1880)
(prohibiting the government from proceeding with a penalty action against the defendant
because the compromise reached in a prior criminal action functioned as a complete defense
against further recovery under the principle of double jeopardy).
Moreover, in United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931), the Court suggested
that a civil penalty may be characterized as punishment for purposes of double jeopardy
analysis. Although the Court stopped short of announcing a constitutional holding, its dicta
in LaFranca expressed the view that punishment "is not changed by the mode in which it is
inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal prosecution." LaFranca, 282 U.S. at 573
(quotation omitted).
10 The Court's decision in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), signaled a
reversal in the trend of applying double jeopardy protection to civil penalty proceedings.
Indeed, several scholars have observed that the line of reasoning displayed in the cases cited
supra note 9 was rejected by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., L Morris
Clark, Clvil and Oininai Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MNN. L. REV. 379, 393 n.45 (1976); Michael H. Levin, OSHA and the Sixth
Ameunent: When Is a "ivil" Penalty Crminal in Effect?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013,
1034-39 (1978).
11 303 U.S. 391 (1938).12 Id. at399.
13 Id. at 404.
14 Id. at 395-96.
15 Id. at 395. The civil action was brought pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1928, ch.
852, § 293, 45 Stat. 791, 858 (1928).
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action into a second criminal proceeding based on a single course of conduct. 16
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and upheld the government's
right to recover the tax deficiency and accompanying penalty. The issue to the
Court was simply whether the statute imposed a criminal or civil sanction. 17 By
applying canons of statutory construction, 18 the Court concluded that Congress
intended the statute to impose a civil penalty and that the fifty-percent sanction
was in fact remedial because it reimbursed the government for investigatory
and other costs of the taxpayer's fraud. 19
Shortly after the Mitchell decision, the Court reaffirmed its statutory
construction analysis of double jeopardy claims in the context of parallel
criminal and civil proceedings. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,20 the
defendants were electrical contractors who were indicted for defrauding the
government by collusively bidding on public projects2 1 and were fined after
pleading nolo contendere. 22 Subsequently, a private plaintiff brought a qui tam
action23 in the name of the United States under the civil False Claims Act.24
This action resulted in a judgment against the defendants for $315,000, of
which $203,000 represented double damages and the remainder reflected a civil
penalty of $2,000 for each of fifty-six violations.25
The defendants challenged the judgment on double jeopardy grounds,
arguing that the qui tam action was barred as a second attempt to punish the
defendants for the same offense. The Hess Court adhered to Mitchell's statutory
construction approach26 in concluding that the statute at issue was remedial
16 Id. at 398. The alleged deficiency in Mitchell's tax return was $728,709.84, thereby
resulting in a fifty-percent penalty totaling $364,354.92.
17 Id. at 399. The Court explained that the "question for decision is thus whether
§ 293@b) imposes a criminal sanction." Id.
18 Seeid. at 404-05.
19 Id. at 401, 405.
20 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
21 The "contracts were made with local governmental units rather than with the United
States government, but a substantial portion of" the funding for the Public Works
Administration projects came from the federal government. Id. at 539.
22 The criminal fine imposed was $54,000. Id. at 545.
23 A qui tam action "is an action brought by an informer, under a statute which
establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the
same shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution." BLACK'S LAW
D -mroNARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the private plaintiff in Hess was suing on behalf of
the United States, as well as for himself.
24 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-234 (1934) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988)).
25 Hess, 317 U.S. at 540.26 See id. at 549. The Court noted:
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and, therefore, civil in nature. The Court acknowledged that the double
damages provision or the fixed civil penalty of $2,000 per violation might
exceed the amount of fraud perpetrated on the government in any given case.27
The Court specifically noted, however, that the civil remedy under the False
Claims Act "does not lose the quality of a civil action because more than the
precise amount of so-called actual damage is recovered." 28 Unlike the punitive
purposes behind the criminal false claims statute, "the chief purpose of the
[civil False Claims Act] was to provide for restitution to the government of
money taken from it by fraud." 29 The Court concluded that there was no merit
to the defendants' contention that the civil penalty was in fact "criminal." 30
Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the civil action despite the fact
that it was based on the same conduct that was at issue in the criminal
prosecution. 31
The next consideration of the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause
to a civil proceeding came in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States.32 The defendant
in Rex Trailer was convicted under the Surplus Property Act33 for defrauding
the United States during the purchase of five trucks.34 After the company
pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges and paid fines totaling $25,000, 35
the government brought a civil action against the defendant under the same act
and sought $2,000 in penalties for each violation. 36
The defendant challenged the civil penalty action on double jeopardy
We may start therefore with the language of the Mitchel case: "Congress may
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for
the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally, for the same offense. The question for decision is thus
whether... [the statute in question] ... imposes a criminal sanction. That question is
one of statutory construction."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).2 7 See Hess, 317 U.S. at 550-52.
2 8 Id. at 550.
2 9 Id. at 551.
30 Id. ("It is true that '[p]unishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be the
result of the statute before us so far as the wrong-doer is concerned,' but this is not enough
to label it as a criminal statute.") (quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899)).
31 Id.
32 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
33 Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 765 (1944) (repealed 1949).
34 Re.x Trailer, 350 U.S. at 150.
35 Id. at 149.
36 Id. at 150.
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grounds. Again, the Supreme Court turned to the Mitchell statutory
construction analysis in determining that the relevant question was whether the
statute was civil or penal. 37 The Court determined that the statutory penalty
was "comparable to the recovery under liquidated-damage provisions which fix
compensation for anticipated loss." 38 Although recognizing that the specific
damages resulting from the injury to the government39 could be difficult if not
impossible to ascertain, the Court stated that "it is the function of liquidated
damages to provide a measure of recovery in such circumstances."4 The Court
found, therefore, that the recovery in this case was civil in nature.41
The Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence in the context of
parallel proceedings continued to develop in two forfeiture cases. In One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,42 the defendant was indicted and
acquitted on federal smuggling charges; 43 in United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms,44 the defendant was indicted and acquitted of violating the Gun
Control Act45 by "knowingly engag[ing] in the business of dealing in firearms
without a license." 46 Following the criminal acquittal in each case, the
government instituted a forfeiture action against the goods involved, while each
defendant sought to bar the forfeiture proceeding on double jeopardy grounds.
In both One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Assortment of 89 Firearms, the
Court held that acquittal on criminal charges did not preclude the subsequent in
rem forfeiture proceeding because Congress intended the forfeitures to be civil
and remedial, rather than criminal and punitive.47 In doing so, the Court
adhered to Mitchell and approached the resolution of the question as a matter of
statutory construction. These cases clarified the Court's view that unless a
forfeiture sanction is intended as punishment, so that the proceeding itself is
37 Id. ("The only question for our decision, then, is whether § 26(b)(1) is civil or
penal....").
38 Id. at 153.
39 According to the Court, the injuries suffered by the government included the
preclusion of bona fide sales to veterans under the Surplus Property Act, the decrease in the
number of motor vehicles available to governmental agencies, and the promotion of
undesirable speculation. Id.
40 Id. at 153-54.
41 Id. at 151, 154.
42 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
43 The criminal statute under which the defendant was indicted is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 545 (1988).
44 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
45 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988).
46 One Assortment of 89 Fireairs, 465 U.S. at 355.




essentially criminal in nature, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a civil
forfeiture action instituted after a trial on related criminal charges.
In summary, the Supreme Court's decisions from Mitchell to One
Assortment of 89 Firearns culminated in the construction of a double jeopardy
analysis to be applied to parallel criminal and civil proceedings. Two principles
were clearly derived from Mitchell and its progeny.48 First, a statutory
construction test would govern the applicability of double jeopardy protection
to a civil action instituted by the government following a criminal trial based on
the same facts. If the statute providing for the sanctions was construed as civil
in nature, then the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar the subsequent
proceeding. Second, only criminal punishment could trigger the protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under the Mitchell mode of analysis, a civil
penalty was not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Double jeopardy
only applied when the punishment at issue resulted from an indictment under a
criminal statute, which then went to trial in a criminal proceeding.
B. United States v. Halper
In United States v. Halper,49 the defendant defrauded the government by
submitting false reimbursement claims for Medicare services. 50 On sixty-five
separate occasions, Halper had requested reimbursement of twelve dollars per
claim when the actual service rendered entitled his laboratory to only three
dollars per claim, thereby resulting in $585 in overcharges being assessed to
the federal government. 51 Halper was convicted on sixty-five counts of
violating the criminal false-claims statute,52 and as a result, he was sentenced to
two years of imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.53
The government then brought a civil action against Halper under the
provisions of the Civil False Claims Act.54 The sanction sought in the civil
48 See Eads, supra note 7, at 944.
49 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
5 0 Id. at 437.
51 Id.
52 Id. The criminal statute under which Halper was convicted was codified at 18
U.S.C. § 287 (1982), amended by False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
562, § 7, 100 Stat. 3153, 3169 (1986). The provision at issue in Halper prohibited
"mak[ing] or present[ing] . . . any claim upon or against the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent."
Halper, 490 U.S. at 437 (alteration in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982)).
5 3 Haper, 490 U.S. at 437. The pre-1986 statute authorized a maximum criminal fine
of $10,000 for an individual. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).
5 4 Halper, 490 U.S. at 438. The civil action against Halper was brought pursuant to 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982). The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, was
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proceeding was a $2,000 penalty for each false claim. In Halper's case, this
civil remedy would have resulted in a fine of $130,000, or more than 220 times
the amount of Halper's $585 fraud.55
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the district court 6 that the
imposition of the civil fine on Halper violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Although the Court claimed to "cast no shadow on the] time-honored
judgments"57 utilizing the statutory construction approach,58 it held that such
an approach "is not well suited to the context of the 'humane interests'
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple
punishments." 5 9 According to the Halper Court, whether a sanction is labeled
as civil or criminal is not dispositive on the issue of whether there has been a
double jeopardy violation.60 The purpose and effect of the sanction must,
therefore, be evaluated, rather than the underlying nature of the proceeding
giving rise to the sanction.61
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court attempted to distinguish Mitchell,
Hess, and Rex Trailer as not foreclosing "the possibility that in a particular
case a civil penalty authorized by the [False Claims] Act may be so extreme
and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute
punishment." 62 When a court finds that a civil penalty sought by the
government after a criminal conviction appears to "bear no rational relation to
the goal of compensating the Government for its loss ... the defendant is
entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs to determine
if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment." 63 To the extent
that a civil penalty exceeds reasonable compensation for the governmental
losses, the penalty is an unconstitutional second punishment in violation of the
amended by the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153 (1986).
55 Ha/per, 490 U.S. at 439. The more precise fraud-to-fine ratio was $1.00 to
$222.22.
56 See United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, amended, 664 F. Supp. 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
57 Haper, 490 U.S. at 449.
58 See supra part Hl.A.
59 Haper, 490 U.S. at 447 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
554 (1943) (Frankfurter, I., concurring)).60 Haper, 490 U.S. at 447. ("In making this assessment, the labels 'criminal' and
'civil' are not of paramount importance.").
61 Id. at 448. ("[T]he determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes
punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed
and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.").62 Id. at 442.
63 Id. at 449-50.
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double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. 64
Thus, the Court in Halper found that a civil sanction could constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes when the sanction as applied in an
individual case serves the retributive and deterrent goals of punishment. In
response, the Court for the first time applied the idea of a double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments to parallel criminal and civil
proceedings.
C. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch
This expansive view of the double jeopardy guarantee continued in the
recently decided case of Department of Revenue v. Kuth Ranch.65 In Kurth
Ranch, Montana law enforcement officers raided the farm of the extended
Kurth family. 66 A large number of marijuana plants and other drug
paraphernalia were seized, and six members of the Kurth family were
arrested. 67 After the Kurths pleaded guilty to drug charges, the State instituted
a separate proceeding to collect a state tax on the possession and storage of
dangerous drugs.68 In bankruptcy proceedings instituted by the Kurths, the
family challenged the tax's constitutionality. The Banauptcy Court held that
the tax assessment constituted a form of double jeopardy,69 and the district
court70 and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit71 affirmed.
The Supreme Court viewed Kurth Ranch as presenting the question of
whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the imposition of
a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate the double jeopardy
protection against successive punishments for the same offense.72 The Court
began its decision by holding that tax statutes serve a different purpose than
64 But see discussion infra part IV.A-C.
65 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
66 Id. at 1942.
67 Id.
68 Id. The State attempted to collect the tax under the newly enacted Dangerous Drug
Tax Act, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987). The 1987 version of the Act was
in effect at the time of the Kurths' arrest; some sections of the Act have since been
amended. K wh Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941 n.2.
69 In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 72-76, (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990), aft'd, CV-90-
084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993),
affid, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
70 In re Kurth Ranch, CV-90-084-OF, 1991 WL 365065, at *4 (D. Mont. Apr. 23,
1991), aftd, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), af'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
71 In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993), af'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994).72 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994).
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civil penalties, thereby making it inappropriate to subject Montana's drug tax to
the Halper method for determining when a civil sanction is "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes.73 Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Halper, five
Justices nonetheless agreed that the drug tax was not the type of remedial
sanction that could follow the criminal punishment previously imposed. 74 The
determinative factors that supported the characterization of the drug tax as
punishment included the high rate of taxation,75 the tax's deterrent purpose,76
the conditioning of the tax on the commission of a crime,77 and the fact that the
tax was levied on goods that the taxpayer no longer owned or possessed.78 In
the Court's words, the "drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed
in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as
punishment for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis." 79 Thus, the Kurth
Ranch Court found the imposition of the tax to be an unconstitutional second
punishment.80
The decisions in Halper and Kurth Ranch represent a significant departure
from the Supreme Court's prior double jeopardy jurisprudence in the area of
parallel proceedings. As such, they serve to renew interest in the debate
surrounding the proper scope of double jeopardy protection.
73 See id. at 1946-48.
74 Id. at 1948.
75 See id. at 1946. Pursuant to Montana law, the Department of Revenue taxed the
marijuana at $100 per ounce for a total tax of $181,000 based on the 1,811 ounces of
marijuana recovered from the Kurth Ranch. The market value of the 1,811 ounces was
estimated at $46,000. The state was, therefore, taxing the drug cache at approximately
400% of its market value. Id. at n.17.
76 Seeid. at 1946 n.18
77 See id. at 1947. The Court observed:
In this case, the tax assessment not only hinges on the commission of a crime, it
also is exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise conduct that
gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place. Persons who have been arrested for
possessing marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78 See id. at 1948.
79 Id.
80 For recent commentary on the Kurth Ranch decision, see The Supreme Court, 1993
Tenn-Leading Cases, 108 HAPV. L. REV. 139, 171-81 (1994); John R. Armstrong II,
Case Note, The Tax Man Cometh, but Fear Not: The Double Jeopardy Cause Bars
Ciminal Taxation of Drugs Contingent Upon Criminal Conduct: Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 28 CREGHON L. REy. 475 (1995); Tad Ravazzini, Summary,
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch: The Expanion of Double Jeopardy
Jurisprudence into Qvil Tax Proceedings, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 331 (1995).
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IT[. THE SCOPE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION
The Fifth Amendment's proscription of double jeopardy is phrased to
prevent any person from being "subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." 81 Read literally, double jeopardy protection would
seem to be applicable only to criminal prosecutions in which the defendant was
at risk of suffering capital or corporal punishment. 82 The guarantee, however,
has been given a distinctly broader construction by the Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding the actual constitutional language, the Court long ago
concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to all criminal offenses
without regard to the particular form of punishment imposed.83 Moreover, in
Halper, the Court extended the reach of double jeopardy protection even
further by holding that a government may not escape the dictates of the Fifth
Amendment merely by classifying a proceeding as civil in nature.84 A sanction
imposed in what is nominally a civil proceeding may constitute criminal
punishment if it appears to be advancing the punitive goals of retribution and
deterrence.8 5
The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed the Double Jeopardy Clause
as affording protection to three analytically distinct components. According to
the Court, the three separate constitutional protections are as follows: (1)
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2)
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction;
and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.86
There is no controversy surrounding the application of the Double
81 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 24.1(b); see also Ex pane Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) (noting that the concept of double jeopardy developed at common
law when almost every offense was punishable by death or other type of corporal
punishment).
83 See Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to felonies and misdemeanors alike); JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 39 (1969).
84 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989); see discussion supra part lI.B.
85 See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
86 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted), overuled
on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); see also Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 n.1 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 440 (1989); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1984); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ.
262, 265--66 (1965) (expressing the three-pronged view of the double jeopardy guarantee
that was ultimately endorsed by the Court in Pearce).
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Jeopardy Clause to those two categories addressing multiple criminal
prosecutions for the same offense.87 What is not so clear, however, is whether
double jeopardy protection was ever meant to apply to multiple punishments
for the same offense. As discussed in Part [,[88 this usually arises in the context
of a defendant facing some type of sanction (e.g., a fine or a forfeiture) in a
civil proceeding following a conviction in a criminal trial. Of course, the same
issue is presented if the criminal prosecution follows the civil proceeding.8 9
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to construe the scope of the Double
Jeopardy Clause's protections in the context of parallel criminal and civil
proceedings came in Mitchell. In deciding the case, the Mitchell Court stated:
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the
same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely
punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same
offense. The question for decision is thus whether [the statute at issue] imposes
a criminal sanction. 90
This passage has been cited frequently9 ' and appears to recognize the existence
of double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments ("merely punishing
twice") and successive prosecutions ("attempting a second time to punish
criminally"). 92
The Court's recognition of a distinct multiple-punishments component,
however, has not always produced a cogent analysis of whether the defendant's
interest in avoiding successive prosecutions or successive punishments is the
actual protection at issue in a given case. Indeed, the Court's holdings in the
87 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 24.1(a).
88 See supra notes 9-80 and accompanying text.
89 But see United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub non. Barber v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1841, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 111
(1994), for the suggestion that there might be a constitutional difference between the two
scenarios. It does not appear, however, that there is a sound basis for treating the two
situations differently. The disallowance of criminal punishment because a civil sanction has
previously been imposed presents the same constitutional question as its converse. See
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[If there is a constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments,
the order of punishment cannot possibly make any difference.").
90 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
91 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989); United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1984); Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1956); United States e rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
549 (1943).92 See Jahncke, supra note 7, at 133.
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line of double jeopardy cases involving parallel proceedings prior to Halper did
not clearly distinguish between multiple-prosecutions and multiple-punishments
analysis. The Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions differed from their
predecessors in this respect. At the outset of both opinions, the Court
specifically framed the issue in terms of whether there had been a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against successive or multiple punishments for the
same offense.93 As discussed previously, the Court's decisions in Halper94 and
Kurth Ranch95 found a civil fine and a tax assessment, respectively, to be
unconstitutional second punishments. The Court invoked the multiple-
punishments component as the constitutional basis for both holdings, thereby
giving the concept a legitimacy that it had never before enjoyed. The expanded
use of the double jeopardy protection, however, raises what one Justice has
called "the antecedent question" 96 of whether a multiple-punishments
component is legitimately embodied by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF A MULTIPLE-PUNISHMENTS
COMPONENT
A. Legislatiw History
Despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment has been part of the Constitution
since 1791, 97 there is still uncertainty to this day surrounding the proper scope
of the double jeopardy provision. The prinary reason for this uncertainty is
that historical records relating to the Amendment's adoption are scarce.
98
What is known is that James Madison submitted a group of proposed
constitutional amendments to the United States House of Representatives in
June 1789. In their final form, the propositions that were approved became the
93 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941; Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 49-64.
95 See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
96 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
97 The Fifth Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, was ratified on
December 15, 1791. Leonard W. Levy, The Bill of Rights, in THE AMEmCAN FouNDiNo:
ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CoNsTrrU oN 295,295 (L Jackson Barlow et al. eds.,
1988).
98 See SIGLER, supra note 83, at 27-34. Sigler observed that "the double jeopardy
clause was adopted by the First Congress of the United States without much debate or
indication of its intended meaning." Id. at 32. See also Donald E. Burton, Note, A Closer
Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy CMause, 49 Omo ST. L.. 799, 801-02
(1988).
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Bill of Rights.99 Included within Madison's proposals was Proposition 4,
clause 5, stating that "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of
impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same
offence." 100 The House sent a version of the amendment to the Senate for
approval that was virtually identical to that proposed initially by Madison. In
the Senate, however, a proposal was offered stating that no person shall "be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecution."' 0' Had this
been the version that was ultimately ratified, it would have resolved any doubt
that the Double Jeopardy Clause was meant to apply only to criminal
prosecutions. Unfortunately, the express reference to "public prosecution" was
omitted in the final version that was approved by both the House and the
Senate.1o2
It is clear, nonetheless, that much of the Senate's language was ultimately
adopted into the Fifth Amendment as ratified in 1791. Only Madison's initial
draft as proposed in the House used the term "punishment," and the reference
to multiple punishments for the same offense is nowhere to be found in the
Senate version or the final wording that exists today.
The fact that the language of Madison's initial proposal was altered
considerably before the protection was framed in the Fifth Amendment should
be significant. The Supreme Court in Halper, however, apparently chose to
overlook this historical background when it alluded to Madison's initial version
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and emphasized that Madison "focused
explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment." 10 3 The Halper Court was
seemingly concerned about invoking the legislative history of the Double
Jeopardy Clause in an effort to validate the existence of a multiple-punishments
component. In holding up Madison's initial proposal as textual evidence of a
desire to protect against multiple punishments, the Court inadvertently
99 Madison's amendments were grouped into a total of nine proposals. He had
attempted to consider all of the amendments proposed by the various state ratifying
conventions and combine those which he considered appropriate into a single resolution to
be submitted to the Congress. Madison, however, did not intend for the amendments to be
attached to the Constitution as an appendage, but rather that they be woven into the body of
the Constitution as set out in the proposals. Accordingly, Madison introduced each of his
nine proposed amendments by stating the point in the text of the Constitution at which it
would be inserted. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).100 Id. at 434.
101 SIGLER, supra note 83, at 31.
102 According to Sigler, "[s]omewhere, beyond the ken of the recording secretaries,
the words 'by any public prosecution' were eliminated from the phrase." Id. at 32. Thus,
the clear directive that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to criminal prosecutions
was lost forever.10 3 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
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highlighted the fact that the Double Jeopardy Clause as ratified contains no
such reference to multiple punishments. The constitutional significance of this
was lost on the Halper Court.
The belief that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple
punishments was endorsed as far back as the Hess case. In his concurring
opinion in Hess, Justice Frankfurter questioned the need for the majority to
engage in statutory construction analysis in order to uphold the sanctions
imposed under the civil False Claims Act. 104 He wrote:
[Wihere two... proceedings merely carry out the remedies which Congress
has prescribed in advance for a wrong, they do not twice put a man in jeopardy
for the same offense. Congress thereby merely allows the comprehensive
penalties which it has imposed to be enforced in separate suits instead of in a
single proceeding.1 05
In an enlightening passage discussing the historical context of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, Frankfurter continued:
[L]egislation of this character, providing two sanctions for the same
misconduct, enforceable in separate proceedings, one a conventional criminal
prosecution, and the other a forfeiture proceeding or a civil action as upon a
debt, was quite common when the Fifth Amendment was framed by Congress.
Like other specific provisions of the Constitution, the double jeopardy clause
must be read in the context of its times. It would do violence to proper regard
for the framers of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they
contemporaneously enacted and continued to enact legislation that was
offensive to the guarantees of the double jeopardy clause which they had
proposed for ratification. 1 6
Thus, the historical background of the Double Jeopardy Clause demonstrates
that its drafters intended its protection to extend to successive prosecutions, but
there is little, if any, basis to believe that it was ever meant to preclude
successive punishments for an offense.
104 Referring to the Court's reliance on the statutory construction approach to label the
sanction as "civil," Frankfirter wrote: "Such dialectical subtleties may serve well enough
for purposes of explaining away uncritical language in earlier cases. But they are too subtle
when the problem is one of safeguarding the humane interests for the protection of which
the double jeopardy clause was written into the Fifth Amendment." United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (Frankfurter, I., concurring) (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 555.
106 Id. at 555-56 (citation omitted).
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B. Ex parte Lange as an Unsound Doctrinal Basis
The existence of a multiple-punishments component in the Double
Jeopardy Clause can be traced back in the Supreme Court's case law to Ex
parte Lange.107 When examined closely, however, the use of Lange as a
doctrinal basis for a multiple-punishments component is of dubious value. 108
In Lange, the defendant was convicted of stealing United States mail bags.
The federal statute under which Lange was convicted authorized either a jail
term or a monetary fine. Despite the clear directive of the statute, the judge
sentenced Lange to one year of imprisonment and a $200 fine. The Supreme
Court issued a writ of habeas corpus due to the fact that the lower court had
exceeded statutory authorization in imposing the sentence. 19
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Miller wrote that "[i]f there is
anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man
can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence." 110 According to the
Court, the common law not only forbade a second trial for the same offense,
but rather went further by prohibiting a second punishment for the same
offense.111 In the Court's view, these "salutary principles of the common
law" 112 were to some extent embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
and Double Jeopardy Clauses.
Therein lies the confusion regarding Lange. The Court in Lange identified
prohibitions against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments as two
accepted principles of the common law. With regard to the former, there is no
doubt that it was embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause. The latter principle
concerning multiple punishments, however, was not necessarily incorporated
into the same Clause. Even if one accepts that such a protection existed at the
common law, this does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause was ever
meant to address it.
Far from relying exclusively on the concept of double jeopardy, the Lange
Court also specifically referenced the Due Process Clause. 113 It is important to
107 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
108 See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 53 (1943) (Stone, CJ., dissenting) ("So far as Ex
parte Lange is regarded here as resting on the ground that it would be double jeopardy to
compel the offender to serve the prison sentence after remission of the fine on the same day
on which it was paid, I think its authority should be reexamined and rejected.").109 Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175-78.
110 Id. at 168.
111 Id. at 169.1 12 Id. at 170.
113 See id. at 170. The Due Process Clause referenced in Lange states that "No person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S.
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bear in mind that the dual sanctions at issue in Lange were punishments in
excess of that which had been authorized by the legislature. The decision in
Lange can be justified on due process grounds alone because Lange had
suffered a deprivation of* liberty and property in excess of the penalty
authorized by the statute. 114 Procedural due process certainly requires that the
legislature has authorized by'statute whatever criminal sentence is imposed.' 15
Thus, the decision in Lange is not a sound basis upon which to support the
existence of a multiple-punishments component in the Double Jeopardy
Clause.1 6 When read in context, Lange simply stands for the proposition that
it is unconstitutional to impose a second punishment on a criminal defendant
when the statute under which the penalty is sought only authorizes one criminal
sanction.
C. The Due Process Requirement of Legislative Authorization
The belief that there is a multiple-punishments component subsumed by the
Double Jeopardy Clause originated in Lange. Since then, the Supreme Court
has often categorically stated that the double jeopardy protection extends to
both successive prosecutions and successive punishments. 117
The previous discussion of Lange demonstrated how the confusion could
have arisen. The Lange Court rested its decision on principles of the common
law that to some extent had been embodied in the Fifth Amendment. 1 8 The
reference in Lange to the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy language was
historically unfortunate because the Amendment's due process provision was
clearly a sufficient basis for the Court's decision.' 19 Despite this, the Lange
decision simply has come to be accepted over the past century as establishing
the constitutional holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a person from
CONST. amend. V.114 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (1994) (Scalia,
I., dissenting).
115 Id. ("[Tihe guarantee of the process provided by the law of the land assures prior
legislative authorization for whatever punishment is imposed." (citation omitted)). See
generally JoIHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTTTIONAL LAw § 13.8, at 526
(4th ed. 1991) (observing that "[wihen the legislature passes a law which affects a general
class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process-the legislative
process.").
116 Ex Parte Lange is the only case cited as authority by the Halper Court in support
of the proposition that a multiple-punishments component "has deep roots in our history and
jurisprudence." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
117 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
118 Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 170.
119 See spra note 113 and accompanying text.
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being twice punished for the same offense.120
Moreover, the multiple punishments prohibited in Lange were in excess of
what was authorized by the relevant statute. This specific prohibition against
multiple punishments that are not legislatively authorized somehow became
construed to be a general prohibition against successive punishments of any
kind.
In his dissenting opinion in Kurth Ranch,12 1 Justice Scalia discussed the
transformation of the prohibition against multiple punishments. 12 2 He wrote:
[A]n examination of the cases discussing the prohibition against multiple
punishments demonstrates that, until Halper, the Court never invalidated a
legislatively authorized successive punishment. The dispositions were entirely
consistent with the proposition that the restriction derived exclusively from the
due-process requirement of legislative authorization. 123
To Scalia, it is preferable to view the rule against double punishments as "an
aspect of the Due Process Clause requirement of legislative authorization" 124
rather than as "a free-standing constitutional prohibition implicit in the Double
Jeopardy Clause." 125 Doing so, of course, clarifies the nature of the
prohibition against multiple punishments.
Although the Supreme Court had never invalidated a legislatively
authorized second punishment before Halper, its decisions in the line of cases
from Mitchell to One Assortment of 89 Fireanns nonetheless suggest that the
Court was viewing the prohibition against successive punishments too
expansively. The Court, referring to the oft-quoted language of Mitchell,
repeatedly held that "the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing
twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same
offense."' 26 The Court repeated this general proposition so often that it
120 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing Lange in
support of the proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments).
121 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (1994) (Scalia, I., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1956-59. Interestingly, Justice Scalia joined the Court's unanimous opinion
in Halper. By the time Kurth Ranch was decided by the Court in 1994, Justice Scalia had
come to the conviction that Halper was in error. In his words, "[tihe difficulty of applying
Halper's analysis to Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax has prompted me to focus on the
antecedent question whether there is a multiple-punishments component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 1958. He concluded that there is not. Id.
123 Id. at 1956.
124 Id. at 1957.
125 Id.
126 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
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changed the very nature of the prohibition. Instead of simply requiring
legislative authorization, the rule against double punishments had assumed a
much broader reach.
The recognition of a multiple-punishments component in the Double
Jeopardy Clause by the Court did not produce a harmful result until the
decision in Halper.127 As Justice Scalia pointed out in Kurth Ranch, even if the
rule against multiple punishments was held to be implicit in the Double
Jeopardy Clause, that Clause's "ban on successive criminal prosecutions would
make surplusage of any distinct protection against additional punishment
imposed in a successive prosecution, since the prosecution itself would be
barred." 128 In Halper, however, the Court not only extended the rule against
multiple punishments to civil sanctions, it simultaneously affirmed that the rule
required more than adherence to legislative authorization. 129 The Halper Court
bestowed on the rule, in Justice Scalia's words, "a breadth of effect it never
before enjoyed." 130
The Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions are a direct result of the expansive
reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause that originated with the Court's
unfortunate reference to the Clause in Lange. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars
multiplicity only in the sense that it prohibits successive criminal prosecutions.
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
359-60 (1984) (quotation omitted); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51
(1956) (quotation omitted); United States cc rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)
(quotation omitted); see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127 The same decision could have been reached in Halper under a more sound
constitutional basis. The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The Excessive Fines Clause could be applied to civil fines, thereby
alleviating the need to invoke the suspect idea of a multiple-punishments component within
the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Kurt/h Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958 n.2 (Scala, J.,
dissenting) ("The Excessive Fines Clause... may well support the judgment in Halper.")
(citations omitted); Jalmcke, supra note 7, at 142-47 (discussing the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to disproportionate civil fines).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has very recently been active in the area of excessive fines
jurisprudence. See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775-76 (1993) (applying
the Excessive Fines Clause for the first time to in personam criminal proceedings); Austin
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to forfeitures of property). These cases lend support to the belief that the Excessive
Fines Clause would be an appropriate constitutional framework for addressing the
proportionality of civil fines. Such an approach would avoid the problems inherent in a
double jeopardy analysis premised upon a prohibition against multiple punishments.
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It does not speak to the constitutionality of imposing more than one punishment
on a person for the same offense.131
V. REVISlTInG HALPER AND KuRTHRANCH
A. The Court's Decision in Halper
The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that the multiple-
punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not exist.132 By
its terms, the Clause prohibits not successive punishments, but rather
successive prosecutions. Thus, a civil proceeding subsequent to a criminal
prosecution is not prohibited even if the civil proceeding results in some type of
punishment being levied against the defendant. 133 The conviction that there is
no "punishment" component within the Double Jeopardy Clause leads to the
conclusion that the Court was in error in both Halper and Kurth Ranch.
The Court in Halper specifically held that of the three distinct abuses
protected against by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the "one at issue" was the
multiple-punishments component. 134 While avowedly finding the civil sanction
to be an unconstitutional second punishment, the Halper Court revealed its true
concern to be more consistent with a violation of the bar against successive
prosecutions:
That the government seeks the civil penalty in a second proceeding is
critical in triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Since a
131 See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 177 n.50
(observing that "despite much rhetoric, no Supreme Court decision has suggested any
doctrinal basis for extending double jeopardy protection to legislatively authorized multiple
punishments").
132 See supra part IV.A-C.
133 In Halper, the Court observed that the "notion of punishment, as we commonly
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and for the
purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads." United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (citation omitted). The observation that punitive ends
may be pursued in civil proceedings is all too obvious. Punishment can take many forms,
and an individual who has suffered a civil penalty may be deemed to have been "punished"
in some sense of the word. The conclusion that civil sanctions can carry the sting of
punishment, however, does not change the fact that punishment under a civil statute should
not trigger double jeopardy protection. The Double Jeopardy Clause only requires that there
be no successive criminal prosecutions. It was never meant to require a judicial inquiry into
the punitiveness of a given sanction.
134 Id at 440.
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legislature may authorize cumulative punishment under two statutes for a single
course of conduct, the multiple-punishment inquiry in the context of a single
proceeding focuses on whether the legislature actually authorized the
cumulative punishment. On the other hand, when the Government already has
imposed a criminal penalty and seeks to impose additional punishment in a
second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibility
that the Government is seeking the second punishment because it is dissatisfied
with the sanction obtained in the first proceeding. 135
The Court made clear that nothing would preclude "the Government from
seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily
authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding." 136 In such a proceeding,
the issue of multiple punishments would be limited to ensuring that the
cumulative punishment imposed on someone like Halper did not exceed that
authorized by the legislature. 137
Thus, the Halper Court ostensibly found a multiple-punishments violation,
but in reality the Court was most concerned with the fact that the defendant had
been subjected to two judicial proceedings. The Court obviously wanted to
extend the reach of the double jeopardy guarantee to protect what it viewed as a
"small-gauge offender" 138  who was facing an "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" 139 sanction. Knowing that its decision could not be attributed
to the successive-prosecutions component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Court instead turned to the historically unsubstantiated idea of a multiple-
punishments component. In essence, the never-before-utilized notion of a
multiple-punishments component provided exactly what the Court needed to
disallow a legislatively authorized civil sanction because criminal punishment
had already been imposed on the defendant.
B. The Decision in Kurth Ranch
The Court in Kurth Ranch also ostensibly struck down the application of
Montana's drug tax because it was a second punishment within the
contemplation of the constitutional protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 140 In fact, the focus of the majority opinion in Kurth Ranch was
specifically on how Montana's marijuana tax could be characterized as
135 Id. at 451 n.10 (citation omitted).
136 I. at 450.
137 Id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983)).
138 Id. at 449.
139 Id.140 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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punishment. 141
Again, though, the Court's language clearly indicates that it was concerned
not about cumulative punishments per se, but rather the imposition of such
punishments in separate proceedings: "Montana no doubt could collect its tax
on the possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished
the taxpayer for the same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the
same proceeding that resulted in his conviction." 142 The Court was repeating a
distinction that it first made in Halper.143 The distinction drawn by the Court is
that when a defendant faces parallel criminal and civil1'44 sanctions for a single
course of conduct, such legislatively authorized punishments are permissible if
imposed in one proceeding, but are unconstitutional if imposed in successive
proceedings. This distinction is apparently premised on the Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition of multiple prosecutions; however, a civi1 45 proceeding is
not a "jeopardy" for purposes of the Clause. 146 Hence, the textual basis for the
distinction is lacking. This flaw in the Court's reasoning in both Halper and
Kurth Ranch demonstrates the need for re-examining the very existence of a
multiple-punishments component. 147
The decision in Kurth Ranch was supposed to have been based on the
finding of a violation of "the constitutional prohibition against successive
punishments for the same offense." 148 If this really is an analytically distinct
component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court should have had little
difficulty in distinguishing it from the successive-prosecutions doctrine.
Nevertheless, after finding the drug tax to be a second punishment, the Court
in Kurth Ranch added that the "proceeding Montana instituted to collect a tax
on the possession of drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive
criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the
same offence.'"'149 This invocation of the successive-prosecutions doctrine only
141 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945-48 (1994).
142 Id. at 1945.
143 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
144 The more precise term might be "noncriminal" sanction. A statute imposing a tax
on unlawful conduct is not a civil sanction because, as the majority recognized in Kurth
Ranch, "tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties... ." Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. at 1948.
145 Again, the better term might be "noncriminal" proceeding. See supra note 144. A
non-criminal proceeding would encompass a tax action such as in Kurth Ranch.
146 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 See The Supreme Cowt, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 181 (urging
the Supreme Court to take the opportunity to address directly whether there is any
independent basis for the multiple-punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
148 Id. at 1941.
149 Id at 1948 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.)
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undermines the integrity of the Court's decision, and it serves to reinforce the
view that there really is no true multiple-punishments component. 150 Kurth
Ranch, like Halper before it, demonstrates that the bar against multiple
punishments is simply a convenient fiction for extending double jeopardy
protection to a noncriminal proceeding that would not otherwise fall within the
ambit of the Clause's actual prohibition of multiple prosecutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions, not
successive punishments. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court based its
decisions in Halper and Kurth Ranch on the unsound idea of a Fifth
Amendment prohibition of multiple punishments. The multiple-punishments
component is a fictional judicial creation that, once invoked, allows courts to
ignore legislative decisions concerning the proper level of punishment for an
offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause simply requires that there be no
multiplicity of criminal prosecutions for the same criminal offense. Thus, in the
context of parallel criminal and civil proceedings, the Double Jeopardy Clause
should not function as a bar to the enforcement of any civil penalty validly
authorized by a legislature.
150 If the Supreme Court viewed the tax proceeding itself as criminal, then Montana's
application of the Dangerous Drug Tax Act would have run afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's actual prohibition of multiple prosecutions and not any distinct multiple-
punishments component. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. As Justice Scalia so
aptly observed, "'[tia be put in jeopardy' does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its
terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions."
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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